Costly state verification models predict that the sensitivity of borrowing costs to financial leverage is positively related to the level of state verification costs (financial frictions). This paper constructs a measure of financial frictions that is consistent with this prediction of theory. Using bond deals from 47 countries, financial frictions are captured as the sensitivity of bond spreads to the issuing firms' financial leverage. This dynamic measure of financial frictions provides new insights into three characteristics of financial frictions. 1) In contrast to the inferences drawn from widely-used measures, financial frictions display a large degree of variability, and have decreased over time.
Introduction
After Chapter 11 was adopted in the United States in 1978, countries worldwide have reevaluated their mechanisms for conflict resolution and company reorganization in bankruptcy. Ensuing reforms and amendments of the bankruptcy procedures have attempted to improve the existing systems. These efforts, initially more prevalent in developed countries, later became more common in developing countries as well (especially after the crisis episodes of the 1990's, and higher capital market integration following the liberalization of financial markets). By design, these reforms and amendments have had important implications for creditor rights and the overall efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings (some improving, some deteriorating).
Widely-used measures of these financial frictions, however, show remarkable stability. For example, a well-known measure of creditor rights constructed by La Porta et al., (1998) (hereafter, LLSV) indicates that credit rights have not changed for 110 countries out of the 133 in their sample between 1978 and 2003. Although, the creditor rights index of LLSV (1998) is computed according to the rights defined in laws and regulations and does not reflect the effectiveness of actual insolvency practices, some survey-based measures of financial frictions (e.g. Djankov et al. 2008) , however, indicate that creditor rights have not changed significantly in practice either. Naturally, studies (e.g. Djankov et al. 2007 Djankov et al. , 2008 that use these indicators do not find any evidence for convergence in financial frictions across countries. These findings, however, present a contrast to those from the comparative law literature. A majority of the studies in this literature finds that countries have adopted international best practices and implemented these laws more effectively parallel to the sharp increase in the volume of cross country trade and capital flows observed in the past 3 decades. 1 Thus, to reconcile the conflicting evidence, it is important to develop alternative methodologies that can account for these transitions in the world and are more efficient in determining if and how financial frictions have changed over time. Identifying trends in financial frictions is important for understanding not only the long-run but also the short-run performance of economies. While, it is well-established (see for example, Levine, 1999; North, 1982) that financial frictions and the quality of more broad institutions are key determinants of the cross-country differences in credit supply and long-run economic performance, more recent evidence (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2003; Aghion et al., 2004; Ranciere et al., 2008; Schneider and Tornell, 2004) indicates that the quality of institutions is also related to short-run dynamics such as the vulnerability to sudden reversals of capital flows and external shocks in general.
In this paper, I develop a new methodology to measure financial frictions. The main appeal of this methodology is that it presents a more dynamic approach to capturing trends in financial frictions compared to categorical (based on bankruptcy codes) and survey based measures by using continuous, financial market data to estimate financial frictions. 2 The empirical methodology is motivated by theoretical frameworks characterized by asymmetric information and costly state verification (dating back to Akerloff, 1970) . Specifically, these models predict that if the asymmetric information is between a lender and a borrower, financial frictions (state verification costs) generate a wedge between borrowing funds externally and raising funds internally. This wedge depends on how leveraged the borrower is and the level of financial frictions. A more subtle theoretical result, critical for the methodology developed in this paper, is that the sensitivity of borrowing costs to firms' financial leverage, or leverage sensitivity (hereafter, LS) is positively related to the level of financial frictions. The intuition is that in a country with good creditor rights, a lender is more likely to recover a large percentage of its bad loans in a short period of time, and thus, financial leverage would not be as important for external finance premiums compared to a country with poor creditor rights. I use this theoretical prediction to capture financial frictions across countries.
To closely match theory, I use firm-level bond deals information from 47 countries, and estimate the sensitivity of corporate bond spreads to firms' financial leverage (LS). I estimate LS by controlling for some of the economyspecific and bond-specific variables commonly used in the extensive strand of literature on the determinants of corporate bond spreads. One important feature of my methodology is the estimation of LS separately for each country. Specifically, by controlling for country-specific determinants of bond spreads, I am able to identify the unique effects of leverage on these spreads in each country and construct a measure of financial frictions (LS) that can be compared across countries. Initial findings show that financial frictions measured by LS are positively correlated with the other measures of financial frictions. The low levels of correlations, however, suggest that a large amount of variation in LS is independent of the other measures. Moreover, I find that the variation in LS is considerably larger than the variation in the other measures of financial frictions. I proceed by testing whether this high, independent variation in LS provides new insights into some of the characteristics of financial frictions. To do so, I use LS in a second stage to answer 3 questions: 1) Are financial frictions stable over time? 2) Do financial frictions affect private credit negatively? 3) Are bankruptcy reforms effective? Using LS, I find that financial frictions, in contrast to the usual finding, are not stable and exhibit a downward trend. Consistent with this, I find that countries' financial frictions are converging over time. Next, I find that the importance of financial frictions as a determinant of private credit, although significant in the whole sample period, has declined considerably over time both in significance and magnitude. This new insight is a unique contribution of this paper since using continuous data to estimate financial frictions allows me to more effectively capture the evolution of the relationship between financial frictions and private credit supply. Finally, I identify 13 comprehensive bankruptcy reform episodes to determine whether bankruptcy reforms reduce financial frictions. Consistent with anecdotal and empirical evidence, changes in LS indicate that the bankruptcy reforms of Argentina and Mexico have been the most successful. Other reform episodes are found to have had smaller and/or insignificant effects on financial frictions.
The next section provides a discussion of the theoretical framework that motivates the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes how LS is constructed. Section 4 answers the 3 questions mentioned above using LS. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
Following the breakthrough studies on asymmetric information led by Akerlof (1970) , a large number of studies have investigated the role that financial frictions play in determining the relationship between nominal and real variables in the economy. A subset of these studies (Bernanke et al., 1999; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Prescott and Townsend, 1984; Townsend, 1979) model frictions as the state verification costs banks face when they agree on a loan contract. These costs represent the percentage of the value of a loan banks cannot recover when there is default. For example, Bernanke et al. (1999) include these costs into an otherwise standard dynamic new Keynesian model to find the following positive relationship between the external finance premiums (difference between external and internal borrowing costs) firms pay and their financial leverage: / . Equation (1) also shows that the external finance premiums increase with the degree of financial frictions.
Another characteristic of the optimality condition displayed in equation (1) is that external finance premiums are more sensitive to firms' leverage when financial frictions are high. This is a more subtle relationship in the model and can be seen more clearly if we linearize equation (1) as:
where
, where "~" denotes percent deviation from steady state. Equation (2) shows that as the level of financial frictions (  ) increases, the external finance premium becomes more sensitive to firms' leverage. The reason is that when bankruptcy costs are low, creditors are not as affected by bankruptcy since they can retrieve a greater portion of a bankrupt firm's assets. In this case, the risk free rate is a relatively more important determinant of external finance rates. In contrast, when bankruptcy costs are high, leverage plays a more predominant role.
Frameworks with costly state verification, therefore, predict that as the level of financial frictions increase, the external finance premium becomes more sensitive to firm leverage, i.e. leverage sensitivity increases. One can therefore, use leverage sensitivity as an indicator of financial frictions. In the next section, I proceed by approximating the level of financial frictions across countries using an empirical model that is motivated by the predictions of theory discussed above.
Leverage Sensitivity as a Proxy for Financial Frictions

Measuring Leverage Sensitivity
In this subsection I estimate leverage sensitivity for each country. To capture leverage sensitivity, I estimate, using firm level data, the effect of a firm's financial leverage on its external finance premium. To do so, I approximate external finance premiums by corporate bond spreads (difference in yield between a corporate bond and a government bond with similar maturity). Of course, using firm-level, loan-specific data would be a better way of matching the model described in the previous section. However, these data, to the best of my knowledge, are not available. To measure leverage sensitivity, I use data on nonfinancial firms' bond deals provided by the Thomson One Banker database. This database also provides some firm-specific and bond-specific variables that are widely-used in the literature. The panel data set is irregular, unbalanced and spans the period January, 1995 to February, 2009 . I chose this data range to maximize the number of observations and include as many countries as possible in the sample. There were 47 countries with sufficient data.
Using bond spreads to measure financial frictions is advantageous since there is a long-standing literature on the determinants of corporate bond spreads in both developing and advanced economies (cf. Collin-Dufresneet al., 2001 ; for research focusing on the latter, and Cavallo and Valenzuela, 2007; Durbin and Ng, 2005 for studies on developing countries). To control for some of the wellestablished determinants of corporate bond spreads and identify the independent effects of firms' financial leverage on their bond spreads, I draw on this literature. The determinants of bond spreads roughly fall into 3 groups: 1) firm characteristics 2) bond characteristics and 3) macroeconomic conditions. I include these variables on the right hand side, to the extent that data are available, and estimate the following equation separately for each country:
where subscripts i, j, k and t denote the bond deal, the issuing firm, the country and the time period. 
It is important to note that by estimating equation (3) separately for each country, I am focusing on measuring leverage sensitivities within a country and thus I am not comparing the determinants of external finance premiums of firms across countries. By doing so, I am able to control for country-specific variables that may affect firms' external finance premiums symmetrically (I do, however, control for the asymmetric effects that country-specific variables may have across firms as discussed below). Therefore, by identifying the component of finance premiums that are independent of country-specific effects, I am able to construct a measure of financial frictions that can be compared across countries, i.e., leverage sensitivity.
The database has several ratios that can approximate the financial leverage variable it V E L~such as, Total Debt/Equity, Total Debt/Market Capitalization, Proceeds/Equity. I used the Total debt/Equity ratio since data availability was the highest for this variable. 4 These financial leverage data are reported in two ways in the database: leverage prior to the issue date and leverage following/during the issue data. To minimize the risks of reverse causality, it is important to note that I am using the financial leverage data that were reported prior to the issue date. As explained below, I also checked the robustness of my results to using estimation methodologies that are designed to account for these risks in panel models.
Recent research finds that, among the 3 sets of determinants of corporate bond spreads mentioned above, firm-specific characteristics explain the largest portion of variation in corporate bond spreads (e.g. Cavallo and Valenzuela, 2007) . Therefore, in addition to financial leverage, I include the well-known firmspecific variables in equation (3) (see Altman, 2000 for a review). These variables are: return on assets, earnings before interest/assets and liquidity measured by the current ratio.
In addition to these more common right hand side variables, I also account for the size of the firm, the amount of tangible assets and equity volatility. It is well-established that borrowing constraints (such as that given by equation (1)) are more binding for smaller firms (see for example, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993) . Therefore, controlling for size is critical to measuring the effects of leverage that are independent of size. Size is measured by the total assets of a firm (prior to the issue date) divided by the average total assets of firms in the country. 5, 6 It is reasonable to assume that the composition of a firm's assets, in addition to total assets, also plays a critical role in determining credit spreads. For example, a firm with a large share of tangible assets may be able to borrow at lower rates since the lender can recover a higher share of the loans if there is default. I include the tangible assets to total assets ratio to account for this effect. I include equity volatility since there is evidence that equity return volatility is an important determinant of corporate bond yields and credit risk spreads (see, Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Zhang et al., 2009 ). For example, Zhang et al. (2009) find that this volatility alone predicts about 50 percent of the variation in credit risk spreads for U.S. entities. To measure equity volatility, I use daily stock price data from Datastream and compute the volatility starting with observations 180 days prior to the bond deal and going back one year as in Campbell and Taksler (2003) .
To capture the non-default component of corporate bond spreads, I include issue size, time to maturity and credit rating as bond-characteristics on the right hand side of equation (3). Although, other bond and bond/stock market characteristics have been used as explanatory variables, this data was not available for all the countries in the sample and therefore are excluded for consistency. 7 Nevertheless, the 3 variables I include are more commonly used and have been effective in explaining the variation in bond spreads. The issue size is included since it is an indicator of bond liquidity and is, in general, found to be negatively related to bond spreads (e.g. Chacko et al., 2009; Pan et al., 2010) . The time to maturity is included since longer time to maturity is associated with more risk and thus higher corporate bond spreads. Moreover, there is evidence that the relationship between leverage and corporate bond spreads is considerably different for different maturity groups. Specifically, the impact of changes in financial leverage on bond spreads is found to be higher for bonds with shorter 5 Total assets are converted to real dollars when calculating the size measure. 6 Additionally, I accounted for the openness of the firm (foreign sales/total sales) and tried different ratios that proxy liquidity, debt structure and profitability. The results were robust to these alterations. 7 Some of these variables are: the presence or absence of put/call options, subordination, optionadjusted spreads and the probability of a jump in the stock market index. maturity (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Merton, 1974) . Therefore, it is important to account for the maturity of the bond. I also include a measure for the credit rating of the bond (described in Appendix A) in equation (3) given the evidence for a strong relationship between credit ratings and credit spreads (see, Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Zhang et al., 2009) .
Although equation (3) is measured by country, macroeconomic indicators such as the GDP growth rate, inflation and the external balance are included to measure the asymmetric effects that these variables may have across firms. Annual time dummies are included to capture the developments in the economy that are not accounted for by the macroeconomic variables. The non-standard variables in equation (3) are the industry dummies denoted by k I . I include this variable given the evidence that there are significant differences --considerably larger than cross country differences--in the transmission of monetary policy (thus, the effect of monetary policy on bond spreads) across industries (e.g. Dedola and Lippi, 2005) .
In estimating the dynamic panel data model in equation (3) I used several methodologies First, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors. Second, I used the general method of moments (GMM) estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) . Third, I used the methodology of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) . In this section, I only discuss the results obtained by using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) since it is better way of accounting for a potential endogeneity bias in the estimation of equation (3). Note, however, that the parameter estimates and the standard errors were not very different across these methodologies. I use the t-1 dated explanatory variables as instruments in the GMM estimation, control for firm fixed effects and cluster by firm to account for the unobserved firm-specific characteristics. (3). 2. The first and second column display the number of bond deals that were available and that were used respectively. The third and fourth column displays the coefficients and the standard errors of the financial leverage variable respectively. Countries are sorted based on the size of their leverage coefficients (in a descending order). (3) Lagged values of the explanatory variables are used as instruments. The null hypothesis for the Hansen Test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (critical value is 6.25 for the 10 percent level). Table 1 reports the estimated level of leverage sensitivity for each country. Countries are sorted by the size of their leverage sensitivities (highest to lowest). The coefficients of the control variables have the expected signs (except for a few countries) and are not reported for brevity. 8 The first column in the table lists the number of bond deals that were reported in each country during the sample period. The second column displays the number of non-government bond deals for which I could find sufficient firm-specific data to estimate equation (3).
Findings
9
As expected, the third column reveals a positive relationship between leverage and corporate bond spreads and that these coefficients are highly significant for a majority of the countries (at the 10 percent level for 42 out of the 47 countries). The results indicate that the changes in leverage have a considerable effect on corporate bond spreads. The average magnitude of the coefficient implies that a 1 percent increase in leverage is associated with a 0.22 percent increase in bond spreads on average. This result is parallel to the recent findings of other studies (Cavallo and Valenzuela, 2007; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Durbin and Ng, 2005; Tang and Yan, 2008) and clearly suggests that financial leverage is a key determinant of corporate bond spreads.
10
The Hansen test statistics confirm the validity of the instruments and do not show any evidence that the instruments are correlated with the residuals. It is important to note that although countries with the highest (lowest) leverage sensitivities tend to have low (high) levels of GDP/Capita, the correlation between the two variables seems to be less than perfect.
11,12
8 The tables and a discussion of the results are available upon request. 9 For the U.S. there were 269,902 non-government bond deals in the sample period. To simplify the analysis, I chose 10 percent of the deals by random draw. 10 Unlike the analysis in this paper, a majority of these studies investigate the effects of changes in leverage on the changes in bond spreads over time. Nevertheless, the large magnitude of the leverage coefficient found in these studies implies that leverage is an important determinant of bond spreads. 11 GDP/Capita is measured in constant dollars and is averaged over the 1995-2007 period. 12 The GDP/Capita levels of the top 5 countries (with highest leverage sensitivities) are below the mean value of GDP/Capita in the sample and 4 out of the 5 countries with the lowest levels of leverage sensitivities have GDP/Capita's above the mean. Table 2 confirms this observation. Although the correlation between LS and GDP/Capita is negative, the correlation is not high.
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The table also compares LS with the other measures for financial frictions. Among these, the creditor rights index (CR) of LLSV (1998) is the most widely-used measure. The index captures the rights of secured lenders that are defined in the laws and regulations and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). CR is available annually for the 1978-2003 period. The 3 other measures are survey based and are constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) . Although more recent (available annually for the 2003-2008 period), these measures are included since they more closely match the financial frictions in the theoretical framework discussed above. In particular, the recovery rate variable (RR, averaged over 2004 (RR, averaged over -2008 measures the cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings thus represents the empirical counterpart of the monitoring cost parameter defined in Section 2. The cost measure (cost, averaged over 2004-2008) unlike recovery rates does not account for the duration of bankruptcy proceedings and measures costs incurred during bankruptcy proceedings as a percentage of the estate's value. To consider only the duration of the proceedings, I also include the variable lncdays (averaged over [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] which measures the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. The correlation matrix indicates that LS, as predicted by theory, is positively related to the degree of financial frictions measured by the other measures of financial frictions. Nevertheless, there is a large amount of variation in LS that is independent of the other measures. 13 Note that the standard errors of LS (computed by estimating equation (3)) are taken into account when measuring the standard deviation of LS and its correlation with the other measures. Notes: The table compares the degree of financial frictions predicted by different measures. Countries are sorted based on the creditor rights index (CR) (strongest creditor rights to weakest) then by the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts (lncdays) (lowest number of days to highest).
The low correlation of LS and CR as well as the low correlation of CR with the other measures of financial frictions is also observed in Table 3 . The countries in the table are sorted based on their CR score (highest to lowest) and then by lncdays. The table shows that for some countries with high (low) CR scores, LS is high (low) and that this dissimilarity is also observed when rankings based on CR, lncdays, cost and RR are compared. For example, for 6 out of the 9 countries with strongest creditor rights (high CR), the average duration of court proceedings was above the mean. In the next section, I investigate whether the independent variation in LS can provide more insights into some of the characteristics of financial frictions.
The new measure for financial frictions and some common questions
In this section, I investigate whether one can learn more about the characteristics of financial frictions by using LS. In so doing, I attempt to answer 3 common questions about the properties of financial frictions by using LS, CR, RR, cost and lncdays, and compare the conclusions. Although the literature on financial frictions is extensive, I identified the following 3 questions that were widelystudied and are also more relevant for understanding cross-country income differences: Are financial frictions stable over time? How do financial frictions affect private credit? How effective are bankruptcy reforms?
Are financial frictions stable over time?
One key property of financial frictions measured by the CR variable is that they are remarkably stable over time (see Djankov et al., 2008) . This stability is also observed in the survey based measures, although they are available for a shorter period of time. The stability suggested by these measures is consistent with the common finding that other measures of institutional frameworks (such as corruption, government quality, measures of law and order traditions) have not changed significantly over time (see Acemoglu et al., 2001 Acemoglu et al., , 2002 . In contrast, it would be natural to expect the time-series variation in LS to be significantly higher since it is generated by using bond market data. If LS measures do not display a tendency to increase or decrease and if the differences in LS across countries remain the same over time, the large variation in LS measures would not provide any new insights. Therefore, it is critical to understand how the new measure of financial frictions has evolved over time and whether it points to trends in financial frictions. Uncovering these trends would also have implications for income differences in the world, as the qualities of institutions (such as the level of financial frictions) have been linked to growth performances. 1995-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2008 Table 4 represents the values of LS for 4 different country groups in 4 consecutive periods. LS is estimated by pooling together the countries in each group. The t-statistics below each coefficient are based on tests used to determine whether the average level of LS is significantly lower than the average level of LS in the previous period. 2. The bottom panel of Table 4 measures the standard deviation of LS across countries in each sub-period (after estimating equation (3) separately for each country) and F-statistics in parentheses test whether the standard deviation of LS is significantly lower than its value in the previous period. 3. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
To investigate the evolution of financial frictions, I divide the sample up into the 4 sub-periods and measure LS separately in each sub-period. For consistency, I use the same sub-periods in the rest of the paper. The number of sub-periods was determined by data availability. Specifically, when LS was measured annually the observation and thus the weights given to developing country observations were considerably small. 14 To determine whether LS displays a general trend in financial frictions, I estimate equation (3) for each period by pooling countries together and by assuming that the firms in the same country face similar financial frictions (frictions that are independent of firmspecific characteristics).
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In doing so, I cluster by country to account for the high likelihood that the error terms are more closely correlated for firms in the same country. Moreover, I classify the countries as advanced, European Union member countries (EU) and developing and estimate equation (3) for these groups of countries to investigate the trends in financial frictions for different groups of countries.
16
The results displayed in the top panel of Table 4 demonstrate a 14 Although, the downward trend in LS was less apparent, using 2 or 3 sub-periods revealed similar results. 15 I tested whether LS was constant in each country and independent of firms' characteristics by estimating models with and without firm specific-coefficients. The hypothesis that LS is constant at the country-level was not rejected. 16 Economies are separated into these groups according to the classification in International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Report, April 2009. All of the countries included in the EU category were members of the European Union throughout the whole sample period. Table 4 . Trends and convergence in LS decline in the average levels of financial frictions over time. This decline is observed for each country group, and the t-statistics that test whether the average level of LS is significantly lower than the average level of LS in the previous period indicate that the decline is significant. The results demonstrate that the decrease in LS was especially strong for EU countries in the last two sub-periods. Although the level of LS considerably decreased for each country group over the sample period, there remains a clear difference between the degree of financial frictions in advanced and developing economies. Nevertheless, the results in the bottom panel of Table 4 indicate that differences across countries have narrowed during the sample period. These results are obtained by estimating equation (3) separately for each country and by computing the cross-country variation in LS in each group. Specifically, the numbers in the table represent the standard deviations of LS, and the F-statistics indicate that the decrease in the standard deviations was significant in general. The decrease in variation across countries, was the strongest after 2002 and in the EU member countries.
Overall, the results obtained by using LS suggest that although differences in the quality of more broad institutions may not be diminishing, there is a tendency for convergence in one aspect of institutions, financial frictions. Of course, this conclusion is limited to the countries in the sample. If the data were available for less developed nations, the results perhaps would indicate that financial frictions have not decreased. Similarly, one could argue that since LS is available mostly for high income nations with developed financial markets, the decrease in frictions is not too different from the convergence found among economies at similar stages of development. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the sample of countries includes 20 developing/emerging and 27 advanced economies, thus giving a considerable weight to both groups.
Do financial frictions affect private credit negatively?
One channel through which the quality of institutions (such as the degree of financial frictions) has affected growth rates is credit supply. Indeed, the low qualities of institutions such as poor contract enforcement and creditor rights have been argued to depress the supply of credit and thus economic growth rates in less developed economies. In general, studies have used long periods of time and measures based on the codes of law (similar to CR) to analyze the relationship credit supply and financial frictions (e.g. Djankov et al, 2008; LLSV, 1998; Levine, 1999) . Using shorter periods of time would not be expected to produce different results given the remarkable stability in these measures of creditor rights. Therefore, given the evidence for a decline and a convergence in the levels of financial frictions, it is a natural next step to determine whether the new measure for financial frictions (LS) provides different insights into the relationship between financial frictions and credit supply, and especially into how this relationship has evolved over time. (5). The first column reproduces the results of Djankov et al. (2007) . The second column reports the estimation results from the model that includes LS as a measure of financial frictions. The third column reports the estimation results obtained from the Djankov et al. (2007) model when the countries in the sample are limited to the 47 countries for which LS could be computed. The fourth and fifth columns replicate the experiments using recovery rates. 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
I begin by estimating the model using the variables and the data from Djankov et al. (2008) . In their baseline model, the authors use CR and lncdays as proxies for financial frictions, and their sample includes 129 countries.
Replicating their results provides a basis of comparison and helps to determine whether one can draw different inferences from the model by using LS. The definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix A. The first column of Table 5 presents the results. The results, identical to Djankov et al. (2008) , indicate that in countries with high financial frictions, lenders are less willing to extend credit. The control variables enter with the predicted signs.
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I proceed by estimating equation (5) using LS to capture the degree of financial frictions. To do so, I compute LS and the other variables over each subperiod (1995-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005 and 2006-2008) . This allows me to account for the time-varying nature of LS (found in the previous section) in estimating equation (5). Note that using the coefficients of leverage (LS) (estimated in the previous section) in equation (5) without considering their standard deviations may lead to invalid inferences. To deal with this problem, more commonly known as the generated regressors problem, I use the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) (the lagged variables are used as instruments). The results are presented in the second column of Table 5 . Although the relationship between financial frictions and credit supply is not as strong as in the baseline model, the coefficient of LS is significant and indicates a negative relationship between financial frictions and credit supply. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that if the sensitivity of bond spreads to financial leverage by 1 percent, credit to GDP ratio decreases by 0.41 percentage points. The rest of the coefficients have the same signs. It is important to note that the strong relationship found in the baseline model may be partially due to the higher number of countries (129). Moreover, since the sample includes less developed countries whose quality of institutions presents a sharp contrast to those of other countries, this strong relationship is not unexpected. However, when I reestimate the baseline model by only using data from the 47 countries with LS measures, I find that the coefficients of CR and lncdays are still significant. These results are displayed in the third column of Table 5 and suggest that the weaker relationship between LS and credit to GDP is not due to sample selection. I consider RR (as of 2004) as an alternative measure for financial frictions and find that the coefficient of RR is significant regardless of the number of countries in the sample. These 17 GDP is included to account for the fixed institutional costs associated with the efficient functioning of credit markets and the fact that these costs are only affordable for large economies. GDP per capita is included because faster growing economies could have more demand for credit. Inflation is included to account for the effects it has on the value of outstanding stock of debt. 18 Djankov et al. (2008) discuss how the independent variables are related to credit supply. results are displayed in the last two columns of Table 5.   19 One valid objection to the analysis so far is that larger firms are more likely to issue bonds and thus investigating bond market data would give more weight to larger firms and would not provide a complete picture of the economy (especially in emerging market economies). To analyze how the presence of small firms affects the relationship between private credit supply and financial frictions, I include two indicators of small firm presence in equation (5): the percent of firms using banks to finance investment, with higher values suggesting more small firms and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, with higher values suggesting less small firms. The coefficient values of the interactive variables in the last two columns of Table 5 show that the negative relationship between financial frictions and credit supply is stronger in countries with more small firm presence.
Sub-periods
To analyze how the relationship between financial frictions and credit supply has evolved over time, I estimate equation (5) for the 4 sub-periods used in the previous section. Table 6 presents the results. One important observation is the decrease in both the significance and the magnitude of the LS coefficient over time. This is in contrast to the increase in the significance and the magnitude of the GDP per capita coefficient over the same time period. The rest of the coefficients have the expected signs. The first observation suggests that financial frictions are not as effective in explaining cross country differences in credit supply as they were 15 years ago. However, the increase in the GDP per capita coefficient implies that there may not be a convergence in the amount of credit supply (as a % of GDP) of advanced and developing economies. Although explaining this observation is not the main objective of this paper, the results in Table 6 indicate that financial frictions may not be the culprit. (5) for 4 consecutive periods. LS measures financial frictions. 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Are bankruptcy reforms effective?
Parallel to the globalization of financial markets, countries have updated/overhauled their bankruptcy codes to adapt to the current business environment. These bankruptcy reforms and amendments have in general aimed to simplify the codes, mirror modern bankruptcy laws, protect creditor rights and/or provide more flexibility for debtors that are in financial distress. It is therefore, interesting to investigate whether the new measure, constructed in this paper, detects a decrease (or an increase) in financial frictions after the laws were put into effect. In my sample and for the countries in this sample, I identified 13 comprehensive bankruptcy reform acts that are argued to be a considerable improvement over the existing laws governing bankruptcy proceedings for businesses. These reforms are listed with a brief description in Appendix B. Of course, within the sample period countries have had other reforms or amendments that affect financial frictions. These reforms were not included either because they were related to laws governing consumers or they were not as comprehensive.
It is important to note at this point that the improved legal conditions (especially for creditors) promised by the new laws have not always come to fruition due to poor implementation.
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It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect LS 20 The evidence for successful implementation is mixed. See, Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2009) for Belgium; Acerbi et al. (2006) , Locatelli (2008) for Brazil; Falke, (2007 ), Qi (2008 for China; Davydenko, Franks (2008 ), Eger (2001 , Herrmann and Keppel (2005) for Germany; Carter (2000), Lubben and Moore (2009) for Indonesia and Thailand; American Bankruptcy Institute (2002) , Anderson (2001) , Abe (2000) , Teikoku Data Bank, Special Project (2005) for Japan; Koh to detect a change in financial frictions after each of the 13 reform episodes. Nevertheless, there is sufficient research and anecdotal evidence that allows me to identify successful reform episodes. This evidence indicates that reform acts of Argentina and Mexico have been relatively successful in increasing creditor rights and in decreasing the duration of bankruptcy proceedings. Feb-99 -0.08 -1.0 ---(0.06) Notes: 1. The second column of the table reports the change in LS after the bankruptcy reform episodes listed in Appendix B (the first column reports the dates the new laws were put into effect). A 3-year period window is used to measure the mean values of LS before and after the new bankruptcy law was put into effect. Columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 repeat the experiment by using CR, time, cost, and recovery rates as measures of financial frictions respectively. 2. The t -statistics in parentheses determine whether LS in the 3-year period following the enactment of the new law is significantly different from LS in the 3-year period prior to the enactment. 3. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
For all 13 countries, I measure LS before and after the reform act was put into effect. For consistency, I measure LS 3 years before and after the reform episode. Results are displayed in Table 7 . The third column reports the change in LS and reveals, consistent with the anecdotal and empirical evidence that financial frictions have decreased significantly in Argentina and Mexico. The magnitude of (2007) for Korea; Thompson (2003 ), Mogilianskya et al. (2007 for Russia; Gutiérrez (2007) for Spain. 21 E.g. Lubben and Moore (2009), Sheppard (2001) , Good (2008) for Mexico, and Laguna (2003) for Argentina. the drop in LS is considerably larger than those of other countries. Notice that, during the same time period CR does not predict an improvement in creditor rights. This may be partially explained by the fact that CR, by construction, does not take account of the decrease in the duration of bankruptcy proceedings. More importantly, the divergence in conclusions could be due to the fact that CR, unlike LS, does not consider how effectively the laws were implemented. Other than Argentina and Mexico, LS has changed significantly after the reform episodes only in Germany, Japan and Spain. This is consistent with the evidence suggesting that a majority of the reforms have not significantly affected financial frictions. Note however, that for 10 out of the 13 countries the coefficient was negative, consistent with the negative trend in financial frictions found above. The divergence in conclusions drawn from the analysis with LS and CR is also observed in China, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Russia and Thailand. For example, the CR measure predicts an improvement in creditor rights in China and Russia. Conversely, LS predicts that creditor rights have not changed significantly in these countries, suggesting that actual implementation has not been effective. The changes in the other measures of financial frictions during the sample period was only available for 5 countries and do not provide any different insights.
Note that using more formal tests to detect structural breaks would be a better way of capturing the effects of bankruptcy reforms. However, the frequency of LS data needed to effectively measure structural breaks was only available for a few countries. Albeit, the results suggest that comprehensive bankruptcy reforms may not be the reason for the decrease in financial frictions.
Conclusion
In this paper I construct a new measure for financial frictions (LS). LS captures financial frictions as the leverage sensitivity of corporate bond spreads. This is consistent with one optimality condition of costly state verification models that indicates a positive relationship between financial frictions and leverage sensitivity. The main appeal of the methodology is that it uses financial market data and offers a dynamic approach to measuring financial frictions compared to more common methodologies that use surveys or categorical data. Using this new measure, I found that the degree of financial frictions has decreased and converged across countries, the effect of financial frictions on private credit has decreased both in magnitude and significance and that in general bankruptcy reforms have not been successful in changing the level of financial frictions.
These different insights into the characteristics of financial frictions underscore the importance of developing more dynamic, financial data-based methods for measuring financial frictions. Uncovering the dynamics governing financial frictions using these models would especially help to measure the persistence of financial frictions and to understand how one key determinant of cross-country differences in growth rates and income is evolving over time. Although the results clearly suggest that financial frictions have decreased over time, more powerful tests needed to understand if this trend was stronger in some periods could not be performed because the necessary data required for these tests were not available for a majority of the countries. Nevertheless, as capital markets integrate and the number of bond deals increase (especially in developing countries), this analysis can be conducted for shorter sub-periods and for more countries, and thereby facilitate a greater understanding of financial frictions. Porta et al. (1998) . A score of one is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders is defined in laws and regulations: First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e. there is no "automatic stay" or "asset freeze." Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as government or workers.
Finally, if management does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Source: Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) .
Recovery rate
The recovery rate is recorded as cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. The calculation takes into account whether the business emerges from the proceedings as a going concern as well as costs and the loss in value due to the time spent closing down. If the business keeps operating, no value is lost on the initial claim, set at 100 cents on the dollar. If it does not, the initial 100 cents on the dollar are reduced to 70 cents on the dollar. Then the official costs of the insolvency procedure are deducted (1 cent for each percentage of the initial value). Finally, the value lost as a result of the time the money remains tied up in insolvency proceedings is taken into account, including the loss of value due to depreciation of the hotel furniture. Consistent with international accounting practice, the depreciation rate for furniture is taken to be 20%. The furniture is assumed to account for a quarter of the total value of assets. The number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. The data are based on the methodology in Djankov et al. (2003) and describe the number of calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50% of the country's GDP per capita. Bankruptcy act 2002 aims to prevent the business of making money by forcing companies into bankruptcy. It is designed to encourage "civilized bankruptcy procedures". It balances the interests of creditors, shareholders and management. The law protects firms from creditors with bad intentions. External managers will be subjected to criminal sanctions for inappropriate handling of bankruptcy procedures. The new law to protects companies from unscrupulous bankruptcy proceeding behavior.
Spain
Sep-04
The aim of the new Act is to modernize the Spanish bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy proceedings have been simplified. The new Act contemplates a singleinsolvency proceeding, which is simply called "bankruptcy" (concurso de acreedores) and is applicable to all sort of debtors (legal entities and individuals).This proceeding can conclude either with the approval of the settlement of creditors or with the liquidation of the company.
Thailand Feb-99
The Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for Bankruptcy Court improves implementation of the law.The law creates an organization better trained than the existing civil courts to handle the complicated financial and management issues associated with bankruptcy. The Act streamlines legal proceedings. Tthe Bankruptcy Court proceeds with the trial of a case consecutively without adjournment until completion thereof unless there is unavoidable necessity. This change is a major improvement over the existing civil court procedures that allowed bankruptcy cases to drag on for years.
Notes: The table provides a brief summary of the bankruptcy reform episodes for each country included in Section 4 (subsection: How effective are bankruptcy reforms?).
